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I. MOTIVATION
Malicious self-replicating codes, known as malware, pose
substantial threat to the wireless computing infrastructure.
Malware can be used to launch attacks that vary from the
less intrusive conﬁdentiality or privacy attacks, such as trafﬁc
analysis and eavesdropping, to the more intrusive methods that
either disrupt the nodes normal functions such as those in
relaying data and establishing end-to-end routes (e.g., sinkhole
attacks [1]), or even alter the network trafﬁc and hence destroy
the integrity of the information, such as unauthorized access
and session hijacking attacks [2], [3]. Malware outbreaks like
those of Slammer [4] and Code Red [5] worms in wired
Internet have already inﬂicted expenses of billions of dollars
in repair after the viruses rapidly infected thousands of hosts
within few hours. New investments have increasingly been
directed toward wireless infrastructure thanks to the rapid
growth of consumer demands and advancements in wireless
technologies. The economic viability of these investments
is, however, contingent on the design of effective security
countermeasures.
The ﬁrst step in devising efﬁcient countermeasures is to
anticipate malware hazards, and understand the threats they
pose, before they emerge in the hands of the attackers [6].
Recognizing the above, speciﬁc attacks such as the wormhole
[7], sinkhole [1], and Sybil [8], that utilize vulnerabilities in
the routing protocols in a wireless sensor network, and their
counter-measures, have been investigated before they were
actually launched. In this dissertation research, we pursue the
complementary but closely related goals of (i) quantifying
fundamental limits on the damages that the attackers can inﬂict
by intelligently choosing their actions, and (ii) identifying
the optimal actions that inﬂict the maximum damage on the
network. Such quantiﬁcation is motivated by the fact that
while attackers can pose serious threats by exploiting the
fundamental limitations of wireless network, such as limited
energy, unreliable communication, constant changes in topol-
ogy owing to mobility [9], their capabilities may well be
limited by the above as well since they rely on the same
network for propagating the malware.
Our next step is to characterize maximum efﬁcacy defense,
attained by intelligent and dynamic choice of counter-measure
parameters such as immunization rates and reception gains
of nodes that are yet to be infected. This is motivated by
the fact that the choice of counter-measure parameters is
constrained by the inherent resource limitations in the network.
We also seek to identify the optimal counter-measures that
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maximally limit the damage imposed by the attacker. The
answers in both cases depend on the network parameters such
as communication ranges of the nodes, mobility parameters,
and also the counter-measure parameters such as the rates of
updates of security patches, etc. While identifying fundamental
limits of the attack (defense, respectively), we assume that the
counter-measure (attack, respectively) parameters are chosen
statically and are known to the attack (defense, respectively).
The last step in the investigation is to determine the attack
and counter-measure policies when both are chosen dynami-
cally, and reactively (i.e., in response to each other).
II. SYSTEM STATE EVOLUTION
Worms spread during data or control message transmission
from nodes that are infected (infectives) and those that are
vulnerable, but not yet infected (susceptibles). We consider a
pernicious worm that may (i) eavesdrop, (ii) analyze, (iii) alter
or destroy trafﬁc and (iv) disrupt the infective host’s normal
functions (such as relaying data or establishing routes), and
even kill the host, that is, render it completely dysfunctional
(dead). This killing process may be triggered by performing
a code which inﬂicts irretrievable hardware damage. For
instance, Chernobyl virus [10] could re-ﬂesh the BIOS, cor-
rupting the bootstrap program required to initialize the system.
The worm can determine the time to kill, or equivalently the
rate of killing the hosts, by regulating the rate at which it
triggers such codes.
Counter-measures can be launched by installing security
patches that either immunize susceptible nodes against future
attacks, by rectifying their underlying vulnerability, or heal
the infectives of the infection and render them robust against
future attacks. For instance, for SQL-Slammer worms [11],
while StackGuard programs [12] immunize the susceptibles
by removing the buffer overﬂow vulnerability that the worms
exploit, specialized security patches [13] are required to re-
move the worm from (and thereby heal) the infectives. Nodes
that have been immunized or healed are denoted as recovered.
Thus, depending on whether the worm kills the infective
before it fetches a security-patch, the state of an infective
changes to dead or recovered. States of susceptible nodes
change to infective or recovered depending on whether they
communicate with infectives before installing the security-
patches. Note that the counter-measures incur costs, since
the patches must be obtained through the bandwidth-limited
wireless media involving energy-expensive communications,
and different patches potentially incur different costs depend-
ing on whether they treat susceptibles or infectives. Thus,
such counter-measures must be resorted to, selectively and
judiciously.2
III. DECISION PROBLEMS OF THE ATTACKERS
The goal of the attacker is to infect as many nodes as
possible, and use the worms to disrupt the hosts as well as
the network functions, while being cognisant of the counter-
measures [14]. Killing an infective host sooner rather than
later maximally disrupts its functions and thereby inﬂicts
damage on the network right away, but also prevents it from
propagating the infection in the network and performing its
other baleful activities. Deferral of killing, on the other hand,
may allow the host to be healed of the infection before it can
be killed, or infect other hosts. It is therefore interesting to
determine the instantaneous rate of killing that maximizes the
damage inﬂicted by the worm.
Another important decision of the worm pertains to its
optimal use of the available energy of the infective nodes.
The infectives can accelerate the rate of spread of the worm
by increasing their contact rates with susceptibles by selecting
higher transmission gains and media scanning rates. Such
choice however depletes their energy reserves which are
limited as those of any other nodes in wireless networks, which
in turn limits the spread of the infection and also their other
functionalities such as eavesdropping, trafﬁc destruction, etc.
IV. DECISION PROBLEMS OF THE DEFENSE
The counter-measure focuses on the containment of infec-
tion in a mobile wireless network. Several wireless properties
enhance the severity of the infection. However, these unique
features can also be utilized to contrive new counter-measures
against the spread of the infection. An infected node can
transmit its infection to another node only if they are in
communication range of each other. We propose to quarantine
an infection by regulating the communication range of the
nodes. Speciﬁcally, the reception gain of the healthy nodes
can be reduced to abate the frequency of contacts between the
mobile nodes and thus suppress the spread of the infection. In
fact, there is an interesting analogy between the spread of a
worm in mobile wireless networks and a biological epidemic
in a human community. During a biological virus outbreak,
individuals might choose to restrain their contacts with the
rest of the society. This abstinence decreases the chance of
getting infected, at the expense of deterioration in the quality
of life: a decrease in the rate of communication between the
members of the society hampers their ability to fully perform
their daily tasks [15]. Such a trade-off also exists in the case of
a mobile wireless network: reducing the communication range
of nodes can deteriorate the QoS offered by the network, as
the end-to-end communication delay increases. The defense
needs to choose the reception gain of the nodes (that is, for
the nodes whose reception gains the defense can control - the
ones that are yet to be infected) so as to optimize the tradeoff
between QoS and damage due to infection.
The susceptible nodes can be immunized and infectives can
be healed through security patches. However, the distribution
of the patch relies on the same resources of the network.
Hence, the propagation and dispatching of a security patch,
if not carefully controlled, can become a menace itself which
threatens to deteriorate the function of the network by taxing
the limited transmission and processing resources such as
spectrum and energy. An example of such a predicament in
wired networks was experienced in the case of the outbreak
of Welchia [16], [17]. Welchia, a variant of Blaster worm
itself, was designed as a counter-worm to defeat Blaster, but
its uncontrolled propagation proved even more disruptive in
terms of crashing and slowing systems. An important decision
problem of the counter-measure is to decide the rate at which
such security patches should be propagated in the system. We
consider two different settings for dispatching and distribution
of the security patches in a mobile wireless network. In the
ﬁrst model, a number of mobile (or stationary) agents pre-
loaded with the security patch deliver the security patch upon
a contact with a functioning node which has not received
the security patch yet. In the second scenario, the receptors
of the security patch themselves propagate the security patch
by forwarding it to other susceptible or infective nodes. We
respectively refer to these two models as non-propagative and
propagative patchings. The decision of the defense policy
is that at each given time, what portion of the propagators
of the security patch, or patchers, are activated, and the
rates at which they should transmit the security patches.
Activation of more of such nodes and increase of their rates
of transmission accelerates the spread of the security patch,
however, at the expense of consuming underlying resources
of the mobile wireless network such as the ever-demanded
bandwidth, battery and process time of the nodes.
V. SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS ALREADY OBTAINED
A. Formulation of maximum damage attack
First, we construct a mathematical framework which co-
gently models the effect of the decisions of the attackers on
the state dynamics and their resulting trade-offs through a
combination of epidemic models and damage functions [18].
Speciﬁcally, we assume that the damage inﬂicted by the worm
is a cumulative function increasing in the number of infected
and dead hosts, both of which change with time. We allow
the function to be fairly general, in that it can be either linear
or non-linear, and consider that the worm seeks to maximize
the damage subject to satisfying certain constraints on the
energy consumption of its hosts by dynamically selecting its
killing rates and energy usages of its hosts while assuming
full knowledge of the network parameters and the counter-
measures. The maximum value of the damage function then
quantiﬁes the fundamental limits on the efﬁcacy of the worm,
particularly, since we assume that the worm has complete
knowledge of all the contributing factors, and uses optimal
dynamic strategies. The damage maximization problem turns
out to be an elegant optimal control problem which can
be solved numerically by applying Pontryagin’s Maximum
Principle [19]–[21] - an effective tool that so far has been
rarely used in the context of network security. Both the
formulation and the tools constitute novel contributions in this
context.
Second, we seek to answer the natural next question of
whether in practice the worm can indeed inﬂict the damage
quantiﬁed above, or the above quantiﬁcations constitute only3
theoretical upper bounds. Speciﬁcally, if the optimal policies
that inﬂict the above maximum damage are complex to exe-
cute, then the worm may not be able to execute them since they
are limited by the capabilities of their resource constrained
hosts as well. Towards this end, we investigate structures of
the optimum policies for the worms. Our results are surprising
and have negative connotations from the counter-measures
point of view since we show that an attacker can inﬂict the
maximum damage by using very simple decisions. We ﬁrst
investigate the case where the worm selects the killing rates
dynamically and the energy consumption strategies statically
(i.e., once at the beginning of network operation). We prove
that the optimal killing rate has the following simple structure:
until a certain time (which can be zero depending on the
network and counter-measure parameters), the worm does not
kill any host, and right after that, it annihilates its hosts at
the maximum possible rate until the end of the optimization
period. Thus, the ﬁrst phase is to amass the infectives and
then arrives the slaughter time. The result carries a qualitative
cautionary message for countermeasures as well: an apparently
inoffensive malware with little to no disruptive behavior might
well be stacking infective hosts for the imminent carnage. In
optimal control terminology[19]–[21],we have provedthat the
optimal strategy has a bang-bangstructure, that is, at any given
time, the killing rate is either at its minimum or maximum
possible values, and has at most one jump which necessarily
culminates at the maximum possible value. Optimality of this
simple strategy for this nontrivial problem is in fact quite
surprising.
We next investigate the complementary problem where
the worm selects only the optimal energy consumption rate
dynamically. We prove that when the energy consumption
costs are convex the worm’s optimal energy consumption rate
is a decreasing function of time. Thus, the worm seeks to infect
as many hosts as possible early on by selecting the maximum
possible values of the media scanning rates and transmission
ranges, and thereafter starts to behave more conservatively
so as to satisfy the energy consumption constraints. Our
numerical computations reveal that when both the killing
rates and energy usages are selected dynamically, the optimal
strategies follow the above structures as well.
B. Formulation of the Maximum Efﬁcacy Countermeasure
1) Reception Gain Reduction: We propose an optimal
control framework to characterize the trade-off between the
containment efﬁcacy and communication capabilities of the
nodes, by reducing the reception gain of the susceptibles.
Using Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, we devise a frame-
work for computing the optimal communication range as a
function of infection level in the network. We identify several
structural characteristics of the optimal solution by examining
the analytical properties of the solution for different classes of
the cost function [22], [23].
2) Immunization: We ﬁrst construct a mathematical frame-
work which models the effect of the decisions of the defense
policy on the dynamics of the spread of the worm and their
resulting trade-offs through a combination of epidemic models
and a cost function [24]. As in the attack model, the cost
inﬂicted by the worm is a cumulative function increasing in
the number of infected and dead hosts, both of which change
with time. The network administrator seeks to minimize the
cost by dynamically selecting the activation rate of the patchers
assuming knowledge of the network parameters and the propa-
gation parameters of the worm. The cost minimization problem
is cast as an optimal control problem which can be solved
numerically by applying Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle.
Second, we investigate whether the optimal policies that
inﬂict the above minimum cost are complex to execute, which
could turn them impractical to implement in reality. Towards
this end, we investigate structures of the optimum policies for
the defense. Our results are promising: we show that minimum
overall cost is archived by executing very simple strategies.
In both non-propagative and propagative models, we prove
that the optimal activation of dispatchers has the following
simple structure: until a certain time (which can be the end
time depending on the network and worm parameters), the
activation is performed with maximum rate and right after that
till the end of the period, no dispatcher is activated. In optimal
control terminology, we have proved that the optimal strategy
has a bang-bang structure, that is, at any given time, the
activation rate is either at its minimum or maximum possible
values, and has at most one jump which necessarily terminates
at the minimum possible value, which is zero. Again, the
optimality of this simple strategy for this nontrivial problem
is indeed surprising.
VI. FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA
We propose to explore the scenario in which both the
malware and the network operator select their control param-
eters dynamically. The evolution of the states of the network
depends on their decisions jointly. Malware and Network are
thus players in a (ﬁnite time) non-cooperative differential
game, where each one of them seek to maximize their personal
payoffs.
We will try to identify the Nash Equilibria, and the structural
properties of optimal strategies in a Nash Equilibrium, through
analysis and/or numerical computations.
VII. RELATED LITERATURE
Detection and containment of malware in mobile networks
from a practical viewpoint, one can consult with [25]. [26]
combined a deterministic worm propagation model with a
game theoretic process that involves learning, in order to
incorporate decisions of users about whether or not to install
a security patch in a wired network. [27] introduces heuristic
strategies for dynamically adjusting the transmission power of
attacker nodes in wireless networks.
Controlling the spread of the worm by reducing the rate
of communication of nodes (i.e., rate-control-based mea-
sures) [28], [29], or the number of communications [30], are
the closest analogs in the wired networks to reducing the
communication range of the nodes in the wireless networks.
The work in [28] is based on heuristics and simulations. [29]
only considers a static choice of the reduced communication4
rate, whereas we allow the communication range of the nodes
to be dynamically modiﬁed over time as the level of infection
evolves. [30] proposes a worm containment strategy which
limits the total number of distinct contacts per node over
the containment cycle. However, this work only applies to
the initial phase of infection and their countermeasure is
ineffective once the epidemic starts. [31] and [32] consider
both propagative and non-propagative patching where the
parameters are ﬁxed and investigates the ﬁnal (respectively,
maximum) number of the infective in the system as the
performance metric of the patching scheme. However, the
patching rate is assumed constant, whereas in our model, we
consider dynamic patching policy and a general cost.
Interestingly, tools from the optimal control theory such
as the effective theorem of Pontryagin maximum Principle
has rarely been used for analyzing network security. Optimal
control has been applied in [33] for a delay tolerant energy-
constrained wireless network with two-hop routing where a
single source tries to transmit a packet to a destination before
a deadline. [33] shows that the optimal transmission and
activation policies follow a threshold-based structure (i.e. are
bang-bang with one jump only.) However, the dynamics of
the number of infective nodes (i.e. nodes which have received
the packet) is not representative of an epidemic behavior (due
to the restriction of a two-hop routing assumption) and thus
their results cannot be applied in our context. [34] considers
a similar setting and investigates epidemic model as well as
a two-hop model and provides the optimal forwarding rate of
messages to follow a bang-bang rule as well. However, the
results are shown for a monotonic epidemic model, which
means that none of the infectives loose their infection. In
contrast, in the context of security, we ought to assume
that there are countermeasure mechanisms which remove the
infection, apart from possible mortality.
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